Reform UK - Housing tax
Cut stamp duty below GBP 750,000
Set residential stamp duty to zero below GBP 750,000 in England and Northern Ireland.
Last updated: May 2026.
Tax baseline
The costable scenario follows Reform's 2024 Contract: no SDLT below GBP 750,000, 2% from GBP 750,000 to GBP 1.5m, and 4% above GBP 1.5m.
- Applies to England and Northern Ireland.
- Most transactions fall below GBP 750,000.
- Rates above GBP 750,000 also fall.
Core trade-offs
Buyers face lower transaction tax, but sellers may capture part of the gain through higher prices. The Exchequer loses revenue and demand rises without adding supply.
- Buyers and sellers gain from lower tax.
- Treasury loses property-transaction receipts.
- Prices may rise where supply is tight.
Illustrative fiscal impact
+GBP 4.0bn to +GBP 12.0bn. Central estimate: +GBP 7.5bn.
- Positive numbers mean public-finance pressure; negative numbers mean Exchequer savings.
- GBP 750k threshold is the main scale marker.
- Gross costs and receipt offsets are separated in methodology.
- Behaviour and pass-through widen the range.
- This is not an official costing.
Economic impact by 2027-28
- Jobs: Housing-market activity may support estate agents and removals, but no supply guarantee exists.
- Wages: No direct wage effect; wealth gains accrue mainly to property owners and movers.
- Prices: Likely raises prices in supply-constrained areas if demand increases.
- GDP / productivity: Could improve mobility, but output gain is limited without housing supply reform.
Assessment
Lower stamp duty can improve mobility, but a very high zero-rate threshold is mainly a property-market tax cut. In tight housing markets, part of the benefit is likely capitalised into prices. The policy is fiscally costly unless paired with serious supply reform or another property-tax base.
Confidence: Medium-low. HMRC ready-reckoners help, but transaction volumes and price capitalisation make large threshold changes uncertain.
Main risks
- Price capitalisation: Sellers may capture some tax relief through higher sale prices.
- Regressive gains: Higher-value homeowners and movers gain more than renters or non-movers.
- Supply gap: Demand rises without new supply can worsen affordability pressures.
Safeguards
- Pair with binding housing-supply reform.
- Publish regional price and buyer-incidence analysis.
- Consider replacing SDLT with annual property taxation.
Academic evidence
Best and Kleven, Review of Economic Studies, 2018
UK stamp-duty notches
UK transaction taxes distorted prices, timing and transaction volumes; temporary cuts raised activity in the short run.
Directly relevant to the housing-market response to a stamp-duty cut.
Housing Market Responses to Transaction Taxes: Evidence From Notches and Stimulus in the UK (2018)
Hilber and Lyytikainen, Journal of Urban Economics, 2017
Transfer taxes and mobility
Higher transfer taxes reduced short-distance and housing-related moves, with weaker effects on job-related moves.
Supports mobility gains, but not a simple GDP uplift.
Transfer Taxes and Household Mobility: Distortion on the Housing or Labor Market? (2017)
UK government evidence
HM Revenue and Customs, 2026
Illustrative tax changes
HMRC ready-reckoners show large revenue effects from income-tax, NI, VAT, fuel-duty and corporation-tax changes.
Primary fiscal scale anchor.
Reform UK, 2024
Reform tax detail
The Contract specifies thresholds, duties and business-tax proposals while claiming annual cost and saving totals.
Defines broad current tax pledges.
Sources
- PolicyLens illustrative scenario methodology: Cut stamp duty below GBP 750,000 Internal - PolicyLens, 2026
- Direct effects of illustrative tax changes Official tax data - HM Revenue and Customs, 2026
- Our Contract with You Party policy document - Reform UK, 2024
- Housing Market Responses to Transaction Taxes: Evidence From Notches and Stimulus in the UK Academic article - Best and Kleven, Review of Economic Studies, 2018
- Transfer Taxes and Household Mobility: Distortion on the Housing or Labor Market? Academic article - Hilber and Lyytikainen, Journal of Urban Economics, 2017
- Our Policies Party policy source - Reform UK, 2026
Other Reform UK policies
PolicyLens estimates are illustrative and not official costings.