PolicyLens

Reform UK - Public finance

Stop some reserve-interest payments

Reduce Bank of England interest paid on commercial-bank reserves created through quantitative easing.

Last updated: May 2026.

Read the policy-specific methodology note

Debt-interest channel

Reform's 2024 Contract claimed GBP 35bn a year from stopping interest on QE reserves. The policy changes monetary-policy implementation, not ordinary departmental spending.

  • QE reserves are paid Bank Rate.
  • Reform claimed GBP 35bn annual saving.
  • Financial-stability risk is material.

Core trade-offs

Debt-interest spending may fall if reserves are tiered. Banks lose income, while monetary-policy transmission, market confidence and bank taxation may change.

  • Treasury may save debt-interest costs.
  • Banks and depositors may bear costs.
  • Monetary-policy design becomes riskier.

Illustrative fiscal impact

-GBP 25.0bn to +GBP 5.0bn. Central estimate: -GBP 10.0bn.

  • Positive numbers mean public-finance pressure; negative numbers mean Exchequer savings.
  • QE reserve reform is the main scale marker.
  • Gross costs and receipt offsets are separated in methodology.
  • Behaviour and pass-through widen the range.
  • This is not an official costing.

Economic impact by 2027-28

  • Jobs: Financial-sector effects likely negative at the margin; broad jobs effect uncertain.
  • Wages: No direct wage effect; banks, depositors or borrowers may bear incidence.
  • Prices: If policy transmission weakens, inflation-control credibility may be affected.
  • GDP / productivity: Could lower borrowing on paper, but financial instability risk makes net effect uncertain.

Assessment

Reserve-interest reform could produce real fiscal savings, but it is not a normal spending cut. It changes how monetary policy is implemented and who bears QE losses. A crude stop-payment approach risks bank balance-sheet, credibility and Bank independence costs that could outweigh apparent savings.

Confidence: Low. The fiscal channel is real, but the feasible tiering design, Bank Rate path and market response are uncertain.

Main risks

  • Credibility damage: Politicising reserve remuneration could weaken Bank independence and market confidence.
  • Bank incidence: Costs may pass through to depositors, borrowers or credit supply.
  • Offsetting receipts: Lower bank profits can reduce corporation-tax and surcharge receipts.

Safeguards

  • Use Bank-led tiering design, not retrospective confiscation.
  • Publish financial-stability stress tests.
  • Score bank-tax and credit-supply offsets explicitly.

Academic evidence

Reis, Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium, 2016

QE funding and inflation

QE funding through central-bank liabilities matters for inflation control and balance-sheet transmission.

Warns against treating reserve-interest reform as a free fiscal saving.

Funding Quantitative Easing to Target Inflation (2016)

UK government evidence

Reform UK, 2024

Reform spending claims

The Contract claims large savings from departments, QE reserves, aid, welfare and net zero.

Defines scenarios but needs caution.

Our Contract with You (2024)

Sources

Other Reform UK policies

PolicyLens estimates are illustrative and not official costings.